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SESSIONS V. DIMAYA: VAGUENESS 
DOCTRINE & DEPORTATION 
STATUTES 
MATTHEW GIBBONS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Through a convoluted legal pathway a nonviolent crime can be 
classified as a violent crime, transported into civil law, and result in the 
deportation of someone who has been legally present in the United 
States for nearly twenty years. Such is the case in Sessions v. Dimaya.1 
Dimaya presents the Supreme Court with the chance to correct that 
injustice by (again) holding deportation to be a penalty akin to 
criminal punishment, and by recognizing the applicability of 
vagueness doctrine to statutes resulting in deportation. This 
commentary argues that would be the proper outcome in Dimaya for 
three reasons. First, the doctrine of stare decisis requires it. Second, 
this outcome conforms with the principles underlying the doctrine of 
unconstitutional vagueness. Third and finally, failure to extend that 
doctrine—in the form of the criminal vagueness standard—to this 
case would appear politically motivated and inconsistent. The 
appearance of extra-judicial political influence reduces the legitimacy, 
and thereby the effectiveness, of the judiciary. 
I. FACTS 
Respondent James Dimaya was admitted to the United States and 
became a lawful permanent resident in 1992.2 Mr. Dimaya pleaded no 
contest to,3 and was convicted of, first-degree residential burglary4 in 
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 1.  Sessions v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498 (U.S. 2017) 
 2.  Brief for Respondent at 5, Sessions v. Dimaya, NO. 15-1498 (U.S. 2016) [hereinafter 
Brief for Respondent]. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 31 
(2016), reh’g granted sub nom. Sessions v. Dimaya, NO. 15-1498 (U.S. 2017). 
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California twice (once in 2007 and once in 2009).5 He was sentenced 
to two years in prison for each offense.6 
In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal 
proceedings against Mr. Dimaya.7 An immigration judge determined 
that California’s first-degree burglary is a crime of violence,8 found 
Mr. Dimaya removable from the United States and ordered him 
removed.9 The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) agreed and 
dismissed his appeal.10 The Ninth Circuit granted Mr. Dimaya’s 
petition for review and remanded his case to the BIA after finding a 
criminal statute, incorporated as a definition into the civil removal 
law, to be void for vagueness11 in accordance with Johnson v. United 
States.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and after oral 
argument on January 17, 2017, the case was set for reargument on 
October 2, 2017. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
At issue in Dimaya is the interaction between the constitutional 
vagueness doctrine (typically applicable to criminal law) and civil 
immigration laws which incorporate criminal laws by reference and 
result in deportation. 
A. Vagueness Doctrine 
The vagueness doctrine stems from the Fifth Amendment, which 
guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”13 The United States Supreme 
Court “establish[ed] that the Government violates this guarantee by 
taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal law 
so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct 
 
 5.  CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459, 460(a) (West 2017). 
 6.  Brief for Petitioner at 4, Sessions v. Dimaya, NO. 15-1498 (U.S. 2016) [hereinafter Brief 
for Petitioner]. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1112. 
 9.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 4. 
 10.  Id. at 4–5. 
 11.  Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1120. 
 12.  Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); accord Baptiste v. Attorney Gen., 841 
F.3d 601, 604 (3d Cir. 2016); Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1075 (10th Cir. 2016); Shuti v. 
Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 446 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 
2015) (applying Johnson to find § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague). But see United States v. 
Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 686 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (holding that the law was not 
unconstitutionally vague). 
 13.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”14 
By invalidating statutes which are so vague they violate this “first 
essential of due process,” the Supreme Court enforces the Due 
Process Clause and secures the rights of the people against their 
government.15 
B. Vagueness in an Immigration Context 
In 1951, the Supreme Court analyzed an immigration statute using 
the criminal standard of vagueness in Jordan v. De George.16 In 
Jordan, like in Dimaya, the Court dealt with a vagueness challenge to 
an immigration statute resulting in deportation. There, the Court 
utilized the criminal vagueness standard to analyze an immigration 
statute, even though the challenged statute was not criminal.17 The 
Court stated two reasons to do so: first, applying vagueness doctrine 
to non-criminal laws comports with the doctrine’s purpose of 
providing notice.18 Second, the drastic effects of deportation function 
as a penalty, like criminal penalties do.19 
In the Jordan opinion, the Court discussed the applicable 
vagueness standards in an immigration context. The Court initially 
articulated that the “essential purpose of the ‘void for vagueness’ 
doctrine is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their 
conduct.”20 Then the Court emphasized that the statute at issue was 
an immigration statute which was not criminal in nature.21 
Nonetheless “in view of the grave nature of deportation,” the Court 
analyzed it under the criminal vagueness standard, “despite the fact 
that [it was] not a criminal statute.”22 
 
 14.  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–358 (1983)). 
 15.  Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citing International Harvester 
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914)); see, e.g., Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563 (invalidating a 
statute based on violation of Fifth Amendment due process). 
 16.  Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1951). 
 17.  Id. at 231. 
 18.  See id. at 230 (explaining that the immigration statute’s “function is to apprise aliens of 
the consequences which follow after conviction”). 
 19.  See id. at 231 (“Despite the fact that this is not a criminal statute, we shall nevertheless 
examine the application of the vagueness doctrine in this case. We do this in view of the grave 
nature of deportation.”). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See id. (“It should be emphasized that this statute does not declare certain conduct to 
be criminal.”). 
 22.  Id. at 231. 
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C. Vagueness in Residual Clauses 
In Johnson v. United States,23 the Supreme Court held the Armed 
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) “residual clause”24 to be 
unconstitutionally vague.25 ACCA statutorily raises minimum and 
maximum prison sentences for certain violators.26 The ACCA residual 
clause was one trigger for the harsher statutory sentences. The ACCA 
residual clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), defined “violent felony” 
as a crime punishable by a sentence of more than one year which, “is 
burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.”27 
The Supreme Court announced “[t]wo features” of the ACCA 
residual clause “conspire[d] to make it unconstitutionally vague.”28 
The first feature was that it created “uncertainty about how to 
estimate the risk posed by a crime. It tie[d] the judicial assessment of 
risk to a judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime, not to real 
world facts or statutory elements.”29 The second feature was that it 
created “uncertainty about how much risk it [took] for a crime to 
qualify as a violent felony.”30 
Thus, the Johnson analysis of vagueness scrutinizes the 
indeterminacy of a crime’s risk, and then the indeterminacy of how 
much risk is required to invoke the applicable statute.31 As applied to 
the ACCA residual clause in Johnson, these two factors resulted in 
“more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process 
Clause” allowed for.32 The Court held the ACCA residual 
clause,  §  924(e)(2)(B)(ii), to be unconstitutionally vague.33 
Two years later, however, the Supreme Court distinguished 
Beckles v. United States34 from Johnson. Beckles asked whether a 
residual clause in the Sentencing Guidelines, identical to the text of 
 
 23.  Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 24.  See id. at 2555–56 (explaining the ACCA residual clause). 
 25.  Id. at 2563. 
 26.  18 U.S.C. § 924 (2012). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 2558. 
 31.  Id. at 2557–58. 
 32.  Id. at 2558. 
 33.  Id. at 2563. 
 34.  Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017). 
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the ACCA residual clause, was also unconstitutionally vague.35 The 
Court held that it was not.36 The Johnson ruling did not apply to the 
Sentencing Guidelines because the Sentencing Guidelines, unlike the 
ACCA, “merely guide the exercise of a court’s discretion in choosing 
an appropriate sentence.”37 
Beckles demonstrates Johnson’s holding that the ACCA residual 
clause was unconstitutionally vague does not necessarily extend to 
other instances of even the same text. In Beckles, that was because the 
“[Sentencing] Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge 
under the Due Process Clause.”38 The Supreme Court has only 
“invalidated two kinds of criminal laws as ‘void for vagueness’: laws 
that define criminal offenses and laws that fix the permissible sentences 
for criminal offenses.”39 The Sentencing Guidelines were neither. 
D. The Convoluted Legal Pathway Intermingling Civil and Criminal 
Law 
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), “[a]ny alien who is convicted 
of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”40 
An “aggravated felony” is defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) as “a 
crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, but not including 
a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at 
least one year.”41 Both of these laws are civil laws. But the definition 
incorporates by reference a criminal law. Under the 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) 
“residual clause” (a criminal statute), a crime of violence is “any other 
offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial 
risk that physical force against the person or property of another may 
be used in the course of committing the offense.”42 
Therefore, there are two issues in the upcoming Dimaya case. 
First, a civil law makes noncitizens removable if they are convicted of 
an aggravated felony43 as defined by a criminal statute.44 Second, that 
 
 35.  Id. at 890. 
 36.  Id. at 897. 
 37.  Id. at 892. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012). 
 41.  8 U.S.C. § 1101. 
 42.  18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012). 
 43.  8 U.S.C. § 1227. 
 44.  8 U.S.C. § 1101. 
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criminal statute includes a residual clause as indeterminate as the 
ACCA residual clause struck down in Johnson for vagueness.45 
III. HOLDING 
The Ninth Circuit found § 16(b) to be unconstitutionally vague 
and held that the constitutional vagueness doctrine applies to civil 
statutes resulting in deportation.46 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
The parties in Sessions v. Dimaya essentially disagree on two 
points. The threshold question is whether the Johnson analysis for 
vagueness, a doctrine traditionally used in criminal law, applies to a 
civil immigration statute which results in deportation and 
incorporates a criminal law definition. The next question is whether 
the incorporated criminal definition is unconstitutionally vague under 
a Johnson analysis. 
A. Applying Johnson vagueness analysis 
Petitioner, the United States, argues that immigration removal 
statutes are not subject to the Johnson vagueness analysis for three 
reasons.47 First, Petitioner points to the fact that immigration removal 
statutes are civil, but the vagueness doctrine has only historically 
applied in full force to criminal laws.48 Petitioner supports this 
argument in part by drawing on the statement in Jordan that 
vagueness doctrine aims “to warn individuals of the criminal 
consequences of their conduct,” highlighting that Jordan itself 
emphasized the statute at issue was not criminal.49 Petitioner 
concludes this argument by explaining that Jordan “did not [] hold—
in a case where the issue was not briefed or argued—that the same 
[criminal] standard of definiteness applies to civil removal statutes.”50 
Second, Petitioner claims that the constitutional values which 
form the basis for the vagueness doctrine, fair notice and prevention 
 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 720 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Section 16(b) 
is materially indistinguishable from the ACCA’s [unconstitutionally vague] residual clause.”). 
 46.  Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 31 
(2016), reh’g granted sub nom. Sessions v. Dimaya, NO. 15-1498 (U.S. 2017). 
 47.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 13. 
 48.  Id. at 14–19. 
 49.  Id. at 19 (quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951)). 
 50.  Id. at 20. 
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of arbitrary enforcement, are not “implicated to remotely the same 
extent” in an immigration context because removal proceedings are 
not punishments in the way criminal penalties are.51 Fair notice is not 
a concern because removal statutes, as civil statutes, are not subject to 
the Ex Post Facto Clause.52 Arbitrary enforcement concerns are also 
negated in the immigration context because, due to its close 
connection to foreign relations and national security, the executive 
branch has historically had broad authority in immigration 
enforcement.53 
Third, Petitioner argues the incorporation of a criminal provision 
into a civil removal provision maintains the civil nature of the law. The 
civil vagueness standard of “unintelligibility” therefore applies here, 
and under that standard “[R]espondent was not denied due 
process.”54 For those three reasons, Petitioner urges that the Johnson 
analysis for vagueness not be applied to § 16(b) as it is incorporated 
by immigration statutes. 
Respondent, in contrast, argues that § 16(b) is subject to the 
Johnson vagueness analysis when it is incorporated by reference into 
deportation statutes.55 Respondent relies heavily on Jordan to support 
this position. First, Respondent asserts that not only did “Jordan 
[hold] that the standard vagueness analysis applies to deportation 
statutes,”56 but also that since Jordan, the circuits have likewise held 
deportation statutes to be susceptible to vagueness challenges under 
that standard.57 Second, Respondent contends that overruling the 
Jordan holding would be illogical because here, unlike the exclusively 
civil consequences in Jordan,58 the provision at issue is in fact a 
criminal statute.59 
Third, Respondent argues that Jordan was correctly decided.60 In 
support of this argument, Respondent points to the “severe 
consequences and punitive characteristics that put [deportation 
statutes] on par with criminal statutes.”61 Respondent also relates a 
 
 51.  Id. at 21. 
 52.  Id. at 21–22. 
 53.  Id. at 23. 
 54.  Id. at 25–27. 
 55.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 38. 
 56.  Id. at 39. 
 57.  Id. at 40. 
 58.  Id. at 44. 
 59.  Id. at 41. 
 60.  Id. at 44. 
 61.  Id. 
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number of sources which illustrate that the civil/criminal distinction is 
not necessarily the distinction upon which the relevant vagueness test 
depends.62 Respondent’s final point is that, contrary to Petitioner’s 
claims,63 deportation laws “raise the same concerns that underlie the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine in the criminal context”; namely fair 
notice and prevention of arbitrary enforcement.64 
B. Does § 16(b) fail the Johnson vagueness analysis? 
Petitioner argues that even if the Johnson criminal vagueness 
standard is applied, § 16(b) is nonetheless sufficiently determinate.65 
Petitioner contends that § 16(b) passes the Johnson analysis for three 
reasons. First, § 16(b) is textually different than the ACCA residual 
clause in a manner making it more determinate.66 Second, the fact that 
§ 16(b) requires a court to apply a general standard of risk to an 
ordinary case of an offense does not make it vague.67 Third, the 
complicated judicial history of confusing precedents that was present 
for the ACCA residual clause is absent for § 16(b).68 Petitioner also 
adds that, if the Supreme Court were to find § 16(b) 
unconstitutionally vague, there would be “deleterious consequences 
for both criminal justice and immigration enforcement.”69 
On the other hand, Respondent argues the § 16(b) residual clause 
is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson.70 In the first place, § 16(b) 
shares the two features of indeterminacy71 which “conspire[d] to make 
[the ACCA residual clause] unconstitutionally vague.”72 As to the first 
feature, “courts [are left] with nothing more than gut instinct,” 
because § 16(b) provides “no meaningful guidance.”73 As to the 
 
 62.  See id. at 47 (“[T]he civil/criminal line ‘is not an adequate distinction.’”) (citation 
omitted). 
 63.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 20–25 (explaining why the respondent was not 
denied due process under the vagueness standard appropriate for provisions applied in 
immigration removal proceedings). 
 64.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 51–56 (explaining how deportation statutes 
implicate concerns about fair notice and arbitrary enforcement). 
 65.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 28. 
 66.  See id. at 29–39 (addressing how § 16(b) is drafted more precisely than the ACCA’s 
residual clause). 
 67.  Id. at 42. 
 68.  Id. at 45–52. 
 69.  Id. at 53. 
 70.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 12. 
 71.  Id. at 13–14. 
 72.  Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015). 
 73.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 19. 
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second feature, Respondent draws attention to the similar inability of 
either the ACCA or § 16(b) residual clauses to identify the risk of the 
“ordinary case” of any given crime.74 
Respondent confronts Petitioner’s arguments regarding textual 
differences between the residual clauses by noting and addressing 
three textual differences. First, unlike the ACCA residual clause, 
§ 16(b) contains a textual limitation: “in the course of committing the 
offense.”75 But Respondent explains that, as it has been interpreted by 
the courts, this phrase does not clarify meaning nor impose a 
limitation.76 A second textual difference is that the ACCA residual 
clause refers to “risk of physical injury,” but § 16(b) refers to risk of 
“physical force.”77 Respondent notes that the two indicate the same 
thing,78 but because injuries result in wounds while force may or may 
not, if there is any difference in this respect, § 16(b) is more vague, not 
less.79 Third, Respondent explains that § 16(b)’s lack of a list of crimes 
compounds the provision’s indeterminacy by failing to provide any 
examples of what the provision intends to prohibit.80 Finally, 
Respondent rebuts Petitioner’s assertion § 16(b) lacks a confusing 
history of case law by citing examples of the confusion generated by 
§ 16(b).81 
Respondent also explains that Petitioner’s arguments regarding 
possible harmful consequences of finding the residual clause 
unconstitutionally vague were also made in Johnson, where they 
failed to persuade the Court.82 Respondent goes on to note that a 
variety of convictions would satisfy the statutory definition of 
aggravated felony even if § 16(b) were invalidated.83 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court should follow Jordan, apply the Johnson 
vagueness analysis to deportation statutes, and strike § 16(b) as void 
for vagueness. There is an inherent difficulty in defining the vagueness 
 
 74.  Id. at 15–17. 
 75.  Id. at 21. 
 76.  Id. at 22–24. 
 77.  Id. at 25. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 26. 
 80.  Id. at 28–29. 
 81.  See id. at 30–38 (“The § 16 residual clause has generated substantial confusion.”). 
 82.  Id. at 56. 
 83.  Id. at 59. 
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required for a statute to violate Due Process: “there is no yardstick of 
impermissible indeterminacy.”84 But in Dimaya, the Supreme Court 
has a yardstick. The yardstick is the doctrine of stare decisis. That 
doctrine, as well as the underpinnings of vagueness doctrine and the 
judiciary’s need to avoid the appearance of improper influence, all 
counsel the Court to affirm and hold § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague. 
The consistent application of precedent provides the Court a 
much-needed vagueness yardstick in this case for two reasons. First, 
there is little difference between the unconstitutionally vague residual 
clause in Johnson and the residual clause in § 16(b). Second, Jordan 
illustrates a historical instance of the criminal standard of vagueness 
doctrine extending to immigration statutes. Consistency and stare 
decisis therefore dictate that vagueness doctrine should be applied to 
statutes resulting in deportation, and that § 16(b) should be struck 
down for vagueness. 
Since deportation is a more significant sanction than many 
criminal sanctions, applying vagueness doctrine here would give effect 
to the doctrine’s purpose of “warn[ing] individuals of the criminal 
consequences of their conduct.”85 Nearly a century ago the Supreme 
Court recognized that “the Fifth Amendment affords protection in its 
guarantee of due process” to aliens facing deportation because 
deportation can result in those people being deprived “of all that 
makes life worth living.”86 Many criminal sanctions deprive a 
convicted violator of much less than that. 
A law is impermissibly vague in violation of due process when it 
“tak[es] away someone’s life, liberty, or property,” and is “so vague 
that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it 
punishes.”87 The Supreme Court’s recognition of deportation as a 
punishment in Jordan thefore invites the application of vagueness 
doctrine to deportation statutes regardless of their classification as 
civil or criminal law.88 Applying the vagueness doctrine to deportation 
 
 84.  John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 
VA. L. REV. 189, 196 (1985). 
 85.  Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951). 
 86.  Ng Fung Ho et al. v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1922). 
 87.  Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015). 
 88.  See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (“[A]s a matter of federal law, 
deportation is an integral part . . . of the penalty that may be imposed.”); Fong Haw Tan v. 
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“[Deportation] is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in 
this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty.”). 
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statutes will further its underlying principles because punishment and 
notice are what matter, not a law’s classification. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court may be reluctant to apply Jordan 
and Johnson here, because Beckles may have been a signal of the 
Court’s intention to limit Johnson to its facts. If that is the case, the 
Court can amplify the signal by upholding § 16(b). However, since 
Dimaya shares crucial aspects of Johnson and Jordan, limiting 
Johnson like the Court did in Beckles and disregarding Jordan would 
invite criticism of inconsistency. 
In Jordan, the Supreme Court analyzed an immigration statute 
resulting in deportation under the vagueness doctrine.89 Consistency 
thus necessitates a similar application of the established vagueness 
doctrine even if the vagueness doctrine itself has changed in recent 
years because of Johnson. And the Johnson vagueness analysis is not 
somehow limited to provisions with a list of examples; rather, the 
analysis is applicable to provisions which are exceedingly 
indeterminate.90 The text of § 16(b), “any other offense that . . . by its 
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used 
in the course of committing the offense,” is indeterminate.91 Thus a 
Johnson vagueness analysis is necessary to determine the meaning of 
the text. 
For those reasons, failure to extend the vagueness doctrine to 
deportation statutes would at least appear to be an inconsistent 
application of the rule of law, and apparent inconsistencies result in 
Frankfurter constraint violations.92 The “Frankfurter constraint”93 is 
the idea that “courts will be effective and respected only if they are 
able to construct doctrine that is persuasively determinate and 
principled.”94 When the 
results of a particular rule appear consistent, it is easier . . . to view 
this rule [and its results] as properly judicial . . . . [When] the results 
 
 89.  Jordan, 341 U.S. at 231. 
 90.  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561. 
 91.  18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012). 
 92.  See, e.g., Jordan, 341 U.S. at 231 (“We shall . . . test this [deportation statute] under the 
established criteria for the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine.”); Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2551. 
 93.  Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 
125, 174; see generally FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, 
TANEY, AND WAITE (1937) (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s views on Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence). 
 94.  Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 95 
(2004). 
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appear inconsistent . . . it becomes easier for observers to view 
these results as determined, or influenced, by factors external to 
the rule.95 
Actual extra-judicial influence is not necessary: Frankfurter 
constraint violations require only the appearance that the judiciary be 
influenced by extra-judicial factors. Because the judiciary is a 
countermajoritarian and supposedly apolitical institution, 
inconsistency leads to a perception of improper influence, which 
decreases institutional legitimacy. 
Because of modern hyper-politicization of immigration, the risk of 
appearing influenced by extra-judicial factors in Dimaya is extremely 
high, especially in the face of a history of Supreme Court statements 
to the effect that, “the ex post facto Clause . . . should be applied to 
deportation.”96 Failing to follow Jordan and Johnson would violate the 
Frankfurter constraint. The Court should therefore find that the 
vagueness doctrine extends to statutes resulting in deportation, and 
that § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague. 
Despite all this, the Court may rule in favor of Petitioner, and 
could explain that ruling based on two factors. First, the Court may 
draw a bright line between civil deportation and criminal punishment 
and distinguish removal proceedings from criminal proceedings 
because “[r]emoval is a civil, not criminal, matter.”97 Second, the 
Court could invoke the time-honored plenary powers doctrine: “over 
no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more 
complete”98 than over immigration law, which is historically 
“committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.”99 
Although an outcome based on those two reasons in favor of 
Petitioner is possible, those reasons are nonetheless insufficient to 
outweigh Respondent’s argument. To conform with precedent, 
advance the interests which underlie vagueness doctrine, and appear 
unmotivated by extrajudicial forces, the court should rule that § 16(b) 
is unconstitutionally vague. 
 
 95.  Lessig, supra note 93, at 174. 
 96.  Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). 
 97.  Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
 98.  Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909). 
 99.  Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976). 
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CONCLUSION 
To avoid the appearance of improper influence on judicial 
decision making, courts must ensure the results of a particular rule 
appear consistent. Despite an order for reargument, the Supreme 
Court can avoid the risk of a political appearance in Dimaya. The 
Supreme Court should formally recognize that the vagueness doctrine 
extends to immigration statutes that result in deportation. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit and 
find the residual clause of § 16(b) as incorporated by § 1101(a)(43)(F) 
to be unconstitutionally vague. 
 
 
